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1. INTRODUCTION: WHO DECIDES?
The critical issue the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA")' re-
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solves is: who decides. Who decides whether, when, and to what ex-
tent same-sex marriages created in one American state will be recog-
nized by other state governments, and by the federal government?
That structural issue is the most important issue at stake in the contro-
versy about interstate recognition of same-sex marriage in the United
States. It is a question legal proceduralists and legal structuralists,
such as conflict of laws scholars, can, should, and largely do under-
stand and appreciate. The structural matters of respect for the constitu-
tional allocation of government, and adherence to legitimate processes
to decide important issues are at least as important-and are probably
even more important to our nation's legal system as-the very signifi-
cant substantive policies concerning same-sex marriage and inter-
jurisdictional recognition of same-sex marriage.
DOMA is an example of a well-designed legal "architectural" act.
Both sections of DOMA were intended to answer the "who decides"
questions-about horizontal (section two) and vertical (section three)
inter-jurisdictional recognition of same-sex marriage. That structural
purpose is key to the legal effect of both sections of DOMA-even
more than the substantive choice of law policy (about inter-
jurisdictional recognition of same-sex marriages from other states),
and significantly more than the substantive marriage policy issue (of
whether same-sex marriage should be legally recognized at all). The
politics of DOMA, the controversies in the academy, and the public
controversies focus on, and are driven by, the two substantive policy
issues. The operative significance of DOMA, however, lies primarily
in the structural confirmation of "who decides" what those substantive
policy positions will be for the federal and state governments.
This Article focuses primarily on the importance of the structural
dimensions of section two of DOMA, known as the horizontal or in-
terstate recognition section. While this Article describes generally the
overall architectural structure of both sections of DOMA, a more de-
tailed analysis of section three, the vertical provision of DOMA, is
at California Western School of Law in San Diego, CA, March 19-20, 2010. The
valuable research assistance of Victoria Anderson, Nephi Hardman, Elizabeth Har-
nish, Sara Payne, J. Jacob Gorringe, and Robert Selfaison is gratefully acknowl-
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1. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006) and 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)) [hereinafter DOMA].
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provided in a companion article that is being published elsewhere. 2
A. Background ofDOMA and the Current
Constitutional Controversies
Congress enacted DOMA and President Clinton signed it into law
in 1996.3 It contains two operative sections. Section two, the horizon-
tal section, provides, in relevant part, that no state "shall be required to
give effect" to same-sex marriages from any other state.4 Section
three, the vertical section, provides in relevant part that for purposes
of federal law "the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife."5
The vote in both houses of Congress in support of DOMA in 1996
was overwhelming and bi-partisan; the House of Representatives
passed DOMA by a vote of 342 to 67,6 and the Senate approved
DOMA by a vote of 85 to 14.7 President Clinton signed DOMA with-
out any veto-rattling objections to the bill.'
However, today, not even fourteen years after it was adopted so
handily, DOMA is the subject of much political controversy, litiga-
tion, and academic debate (as the diverse papers in this Symposium
illustrate). Indeed, a bill to repeal both sections of DOMA is pending
in Congress.9 Mr. Nadler, Representative from New York, introduced
House Bill 3567, titled "Respect for Marriage Act of 2009," in the
House of Representatives on September 15, 2009 with scores of co-
sponsors.10 If Congress passes this bill, it will explicitly repeal section
2. See Lynn D. Wardle, Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act: Decid-
ing, Democracy and the Constitution, 59 DRAKE L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2010)
[hereinafter Wardle, Section Three].
3. DOMA, supra note 1.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
5. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
6. 142 CONG. REc. H7480-05 (daily ed. July 12, 1996).
7. 142 CONG. REc. S10129-01 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996).
8. Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality
Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1186 (2009) (contrasting lack of
public backlash to judicial decisions invalidating anti-miscegenation laws with
strong public backlash to judicial decisions mandating same-sex marriage).
9. Respect for Marriage Act of 2009, H.R. 3567, 111th Cong. (2009), availa-
ble at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c 11 :H.R.3567.IH:.
10. Id.
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two and effectively repeal section three of DOMA." Additionally,
though all prior lawsuits challenging DOMA have failed (on both
substantive and procedural grounds),12 the environment has been
changed by the recent decisions of a Massachusetts federal district
court in two sibling lawsuits challenging section three of DOMA."
Massachusetts' judicial environmentl and political climate have long
been favorable to various gay rights challenges.' 5
B. Overview
Section two of DOMA was designed to create federal protection
against the growing threat that legalization of same-sex marriage in
one state would open the door for, and encourage, judges to interpret
federal law (particularly full faith and credit doctrines) in a manner
that would force other states to recognize same-sex marriage over ob-
11. Id.
12. See Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 686 (9th Cir. 2006), aff'g 374
F. Supp. 2d 861 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (affirming dismissal of a section two claim, and
remanding to dismiss a section three claim on standing); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F.
Supp. 2d 1298, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 148 (Bankr.
W.D. Wash. 2004); see also Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 7,
Smelt v. United States, No. 8:09-cv-00286-DOC-MLG (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 24,
2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/19079566/Order-Dismissing-Smelt-
v-United-States-of-America.
13. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d
234 (D. Mass. 2010); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass.
2010). See generally Mary L. Bonauto, DOMA Damages Same-Sex Families and
Their Children, 32 FAM. ADVOC. 10, 16 (2010).
14. See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 474 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D. Mass. 2007), aff'd,
514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008).
15. Massachusetts may be the most "gay-receptive" jurisdiction in America; in
2003, Massachusetts was the first state to legalize same-sex marriage when the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts mandated the legalization of same-sex mar-
riage. Goodridge v. Dep't Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003). Massa-
chusetts not only allows gay partner adoption, but has forced Catholic Social
Services in Boston to quit offering adoptions because it would not provide children
to same-sex couples for adoption. Daniel Avila, Same-Sex Adoption in Massachu-
setts, the Catholic Church, and the Good of the Children: The Story Behind the Con-
troversy and the Case for Conscientious Refusals, 27 CHILD. LEGAL RTs. J. 1, 1
(2007). Public schools in Massachusetts indoctrinate children in the acceptance of
gay and lesbian lifestyles over parental objection. See Parker supra note 14, at 269-
74.
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jections from the people and lawmakers in those states.' 6 Similarly,
section three was intended to prevent federal judges and agency offi-
cials from using federal choice of law and interpretative principles to
recognize same-sex marriages in federal laws, regulations, and pro-
grams before Congress decided such recognition was appropriate.17
Part II of this article analyzes how DOMA reflects and respects
principles of federalism in both its horizontal (section two) and vertic-
al (section three) marriage recognition sections, and in the overall arc-
hitectural structure of the act. Part II.A. shows that the drafters of
DOMA designed section two to preserve the states' choice of authori-
ty over horizontal marriage recognition in the face of twin pressures
(vertical and horizontal) to force states to recognize same-sex mar-
riage. Part II.B. proves that claims that section two of DOMA violates
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and other constitutional provisions,
are meritless. Part III provides some comparative choice of law pers-
pectives on section two of DOMA to show how it protects the over-
whelming policy interests of the states; specifically, how most states
still refuse to recognize same-sex marriage and continually want to
have that policy protected. Part III also compares principles governing
marriage recognition in section two with marriage recognition rules
and principles governing international marriage recognition. It de-
scribes that in substantially all respects, DOMA embodies and reflects
globally well-respected and widely-followed dominant principles of
marriage recognition in private international law.
Part IV briefly reviews section three of DOMA and the structural
constitutional objections to it. It discusses how section three of
DOMA was intended to preserve Congress's control over deciding the
issue regarding when and to what extent same-sex marriages, created
in states, will be recognized in federal law against two challenges to
take that decision-making authority from Congress. It also summariz-
es why the claims that section three of DOMA violates the constitu-
16. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2, 6-10 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2905, 2906, 2910-14; The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 28-32 (1996) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Lynn D. Wardle); Hearings, supra at 62 (statement of Jay Alan Seku-
low).
17. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 10-12; Hearings, supra note 16, at 32-35
(statement of Lynn D. Wardle); Hearings, supra note 16, at 62 (statement of Jay
Alan Sekulow).
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tional principle of federalism are groundless.
Part V concludes by noting the value of DOMA as an architectur-
al provision that protects the constitutional allocation of power to de-
cide such hotly contested policy questions as to whether same-sex
marriages, created validly in other jurisdictions, should be recognized.
This is because section two preserves the architecture of federalism, in
both its horizontal federalism (state-federal relations) and in its lateral
federalism (equal respect for all states within the federal union of the
states). The threatening conditions that caused Congress to enact
DOMA to protect the authority of the states to decide the marriage
recognition question for their own sovereign jurisdictions have not
disappeared, but are more ominous than ever before. Thus, for reasons
of constitutional structure, especially federalism, DOMA is still neces-
sary and is constitutional.
II. INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE UNDER
SECTION Two OF DOMA
Section two of DOMA, the interstate recognition or full faith and
credit provision, provides:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relation-
ship.
This section can be called the horizontal provision as it concerns
the interstate effect in other states of same-sex marriages created in
one state. It is horizontal because it primarily concerns the relations
among the co-equal sovereign states of the Union concerning inter-
state recognition of certain marriages, validly created in one of the
states. However, section two also has an important vertical dimension
because it addresses relations between the national government and
the states in one respect. While Congress lacks the authority to regu-
late the subject of marriages (or any other domestic relationships) di-
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
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rectly,19 the Constitution gives Congress the authority to "pre-
scribe ... the Effect[s] thereof' that must be given in each state to the
"public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings" of the other states. 20
That includes the power to determine rules for interstate recognition of
domestic relationships. Therefore, Congress has the power to tell the
states when they must, and when they may not, recognize the domes-
tic relations laws, records, and judgments of other states. Indeed, Con-
gress has enacted rules governing when and to what extent mandatory
interstate recognition must be given to other domestic relationships
well before Congress even considered DOMA.21
Thus, vis-d-vis the federal government, DOMA section two pro-
tects what Alexander Hamilton described as "the constitutional equili-
brium between the general and the State governments." 22 It protects
constitutional state sovereignty regarding an issue (the regulation of
domestic relations), which the Supreme Court has described as re-
served for and falling within "a virtually exclusive province of the
states." 23 It protects horizontal federalism by preserving the right of
each state to decide for itself whether it will recognize same-sex mar-
riage. It also protects strong policy values such as: respect for the
commitment to preserve and foster pluralism; the belief that laws re-
gulating families should reflect local values; respect for the expertise
of state courts (then existing and experienced, unlike the federal courts
that were being created anew and were expected to focus on issues of
national concern); and the belief that the federal government has more
19. See generally Wardle, supra note 2, at Part IV.
20. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1.
21. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act was enacted by Congress in 1980
and compelled interstate recognition and non-modification of child custody orders.
The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 8(a), 94
Stat. 3469 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A). Likewise, two years before Congress
enacted DOMA, it set rules for the interstate recognition, enforcement, and non-
modification of child support orders. Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-383, § 3(a), 108 Stat. 4064 (1994) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1738B). Less than a month before it passed DOMA, Congress amended this law
concerning interstate recognition and enforcement of child support. Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, § 322, 110 Stat. 2221 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 173 8B).
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 197 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
23. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975).
2010] 149
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than enough other important issues to address under the Constitu-
24tion.
A. The Neutrality of Section Two ofDOMA
Section two of DOMA establishes both the complete horizontal
and vertical neutrality of federal law, especially federal full faith and
credit and choice of law rules, applicable to interstate recognition of
same-sex marriage. Section two's neutrality is especially apparent
when one considers the pro-recognition or anti-recognition horizontal
rules that Congress could have enacted. For example, Congress could
have considered passing a law that mandated no interstate recognition
for same-sex marriage. Under Article IV, Congress arguably could
have established as a matter of federal law that no state may give any
faith and credit to same-sex marriages performed in other states. 25 On
the other hand, Congress could have passed a law under Article IV
that mandated compulsory recognition by all states of same-sex mar-
riages validly contracted in any other state; that all states must recog-
nize such same-sex marriages.26 Thus, Congress chose not to adopt a
substantive position when it could have created a substantive marriage
policy for interstate recognition or non-recognition of same-sex mar-
riage.
Congress did not take any federal position on the policy or merits
of interstate recognition of same-sex marriage, and instead adopted a
rule that left the marriage recognition issue to each state to decide for
itself, as had been the rule under the Constitution for over two centu-
24. See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Tyranny, Federalism, and the Federal
Marriage Amendment, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMiNISM 221, 224-55 (2005) (discussing
the power the state governments were meant to have versus the national govern-
ment); Lynn D. Wardle, The Proposed Federal Marriage Amendment and the Risks
to Federalism in Family Law, 2 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 137, 158-86 (2004).
25. Congress has enacted similar non-recognition provisions in the past. See,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (2006); see also Alaska Packers
Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547-50 (1935); Miller v. Kingsley,
230 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Neb. 1975); McGrath v. Tobin, 103 A.2d 795, 798 (R.I.
1954).
26. Congress has enacted similar mandatory recognition provisions in the past.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006); 42 U.S.C § 1983 (2006); see also Hazen Re-
search, Inc. v. Omega Minerals, Inc. 497 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1974); State v.
Leming, 46 So. 2d 262, 283-84 (La. 1950).
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ries.27 Thus, DOMA protects by federal law the principle of volunta-
ry28 recognition or non-recognition by each state of same-sex marriag-
es from other states. In so doing, DOMA reinforced the well-
established existing federalism principle of respect for the authority of
each United States sovereign entity to regulate matters allocated by
the Constitution to that sovereign. This includes respect for the sove-
reignty of the state to directly regulate and control the creation and
recognition of domestic relations, including same-sex marriages, with-
in their own territories.29
DOMA preserved and protected state self-determination for mar-
riage recognition against forced rejection of the long-established rule
governing interstate recognition of marriage. That rule, and section
two of DOMA, allows each affected state to choose for itself whether
or not to recognize same-sex marriages validly contracted in other
states.30 Section two of DOMA did not change the existing law, but
merely codified the long-established federal choice of law rule and
full faith and credit principle that states may choose for themselves
whether to recognize controversial marriages, validly contracted in
other states, or to refuse to apply or enforce laws, rules, and doctrines
of sister states that are contrary to the strong public policy of the fo-
rum. Thus, section two of DOMA was enacted to determine who de-
27. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006); U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1.
28. It is voluntary because each state is explicitly authorized to decide for it-
self whether or not to recognize such relationships. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
29. See, e.g., Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 772, 962-64 (1983) (discussing the importance of deciding such is-
sues at the state level); Linda J. Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii Bind the
World? A Comment on Same-Sex Marriage and Federalism Values, 16 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 191, 197-200 (1996) (discussing the importance of domiciliary nexus for
marriage regulation); Linda Silberman & Karin Wolfe, The Importance of Private
International Law for Family Issues in an Era of Globalization: Two Case Studies-
International Child Abduction and Same-Sex Unions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 233,
271-72 (2003) (discussing the importance of protecting marriage norms of particular
state communities in choice of law). See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Non-
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage Judgments Under DOMA and the Constitution,
38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 365, 395-404 (2005) (discussing the importance of protect-
ing state interests against sister-state regulatory bleeding, and the importance of
state interests in domestic relations).
30. Linda J. Silberman, Rethinking Rules of Conflict of Laws in Marriage and
Divorce in the United States: What Can We Learn From Europe?, 82 TUL. L. REV.
1999, 2001 (2008).
2010] 151
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cides the controversial question of whether courts of any particular
state will or will not recognize same-sex marriages validly created in
another state. 31 Some same-sex marriage advocates in the legal com-
munity criticize the horizontal and vertical aspects of section two of
DOMA, and wish to have Congress mandate a change to existing
choice of law rules to require recognition of same-sex marriage; yet
the precedents and policies behind section two's marriage recognition
rule are settled, clear, and well-grounded in long-established prin-
ciples of full faith and credit, choice of law, and domestic relations
law and policy.32
Finally, the language of section two underscores the structural fo-
cus of the provision as well as its neutrality. The language is nega-
tive-no state shall be required to recognize same-sex marriage from
other states. 33 This emphasizes the structural, shielding purpose of
section two. If the purpose were substantive, to entitle or assert en-
titlement, positive language would have been used. Thus, the negative
language reinforces the structural purpose of section two.
B. The Constitutionality of Section Two Under Article IV
After more than a dozen years, at least before the July 2010 feder-
al district court decisions of Judge Tauro in Massachusetts, 34 it
seemed that the constitutionality of section two of DOMA was no
longer seriously in doubt. Even after these Massachusetts decisions,
the constitutional challenges seem quite strained. The overwhelming
consensus of conflicts scholars (and historically the correct position)
is that under long-established and unambiguous principles of both
choice of law and full faith and credit, a state may constitutionally
31. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
32. See Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for Interju-
risdictional Recognition ofNon-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147,
158-64 (1998); Richard S. Myers, Same-Sex "Marriage" and the Public Policy
Doctrine, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 45, 55-59 (1998); Michael E. Solimine, Competi-
tive Federalism and Interstate Recognition of Marriage, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 83,
99-102 (1998); Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North Carolina, Divorce Recognition,
and Same-Sex Marriage Recognition, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 187, 226-33 (1998).
See generally Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255 (1998).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
34. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
10
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2010], Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol41/iss1/8
THE FEDERAL ARCHITECTURE OF DOMA
refuse to recognize same-sex marriages that are valid in other states if
such unions violate the strong public policy of the forum.35 Section
two's preservation of state authority to determine whether or not to
recognize same-sex marriage is permissible and appropriate under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. In a nutshell: (a) the
Constitution gives Congress the authority to "prescribe ... the Ef-
fect[s] thereof' that must be given in each state to the "public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings" of the other states; 36 (b) section
two of DOMA was passed specifically with reference to this power; 37
and (c) section two merely codified two hundred years of common
law practice of both the federal government and the states-the notion
that each state decides for itself whether recognition of a marriage
from another jurisdiction would violate such a strong local public pol-
icy that it will not recognize the foreign marriage.38 There is little
credible support for the claim that state-self-determination-in-
marriage-recognition, provided by section two, is unconstitutional un-
der the Full Faith and Credit Clause or any other structural provision.
Professor Lea Brilmayer39 succinctly summarized the status of credi-
ble scholarly opinion when she testified before Congress:
Although some people have expressed skepticism about whether
DOMA is constitutional, these are mostly people whose expertise
lies outside the area of conflict of laws. Even most lawyers are not
35. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause to the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 353,
354-55 (2005); Maurice J. Holland, The Modest Usefulness of DOMA Section 2, 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 395, 396-98 (1998); Wardle, supra note 32, at 214-19; Ralph U.
Whitten, Full Faith and Credit for Dummies, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 465, 480-82
(2005); Whitten, supra note 32, at 372-73.
36. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). See also H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 24-25
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2929-30; Hearings, supra note 16, at 28-32
(statement of Lynn D. Wardle).
38. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. See generally Lynn D. War-
die, From Slavery to Same-Sex Marriage: Comity Versus Public Policy in Inter-
Jurisdictional Recognition of Controversial Domestic Relations, 2008 BYU L. REV.
1855 (2008) [hereinafter Wardle, Slavery] (providing the history of state recognition
of controversial domestic relations from other jurisdictions, and of non-recognition
when deemed volatile of strong public policy).
39. Howard M. Holtzmann Professor of International Law, Yale University
School of Law, New Haven, Connecticut.
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fully familiar with the history of congressional implementation of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and they underestimate the lati-
tude it gives to adopt legislation. Constitutional power to enact
such legislation is found in Article IV itself ....
There is little serious doubt that section two of DOMA falls with-
in Article IV's grant of congressional power. Moreover, it is not in-
significant that key state court opinions that legalized same-sex mar-
riage also indicated no expectation that such marriages would
necessarily be recognized elsewhere; similarly those jurisdictions de-
nied any desire or attempt to export same-sex marriages into other ju-
risdictions.4 1
Additionally, section two of DOMA has a significant separation
of powers dimension that reinforces that core constitutional principle.
It preserves the issue for the state systems in which legislatures have
the chance to assert their own authority over the marriage recognition
issue, if they wish. 42 Moreover, section two recognizes legislative su-
40. Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What are the National Implications of
the Massachusetts Goodridge Decision and the Judicial Invalidation of Traditional
Marriage Laws?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, &
Property Rights of the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 108 Cong. 70 (2004) (statement
of Professor Lea Brilmayer), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/ con-
gress/senate/pdf/108hrg/96924.pdf See also Lea Brilmayer, Full Faith and Credit,
WALL ST. J., March 9, 2004, at Al 6; Emily J. Sack, Domestic Violence Across State
Lines: The Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congressional Power, and Interstate En-
forcement of Protection Orders, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 827, 888-89 (2004) ("some ad-
vocates and scholars on both sides of the DOMA debate acknowledged that due to
the 'public policy exception,' other states with connection to the parties likely would
not have to recognize same-sex marriages from another state. Opponents of the leg-
islation therefore argued it was unnecessary because the Constitution itself would
not require states to give the same-sex marriages recognition." (footnote omitted)).
41. Silberman & Wolfe, supra note 29, at 254-56 nn.102-04, 258-60 (noting
that even nations that have created same-sex unions indicate they are unlikely to be
recognized in most other jurisdictions). See also In re Opinions of the Justices to the
Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 571 (Mass. 2004) (noting Massachusetts same-sex marriag-
es may not be recognized elsewhere, and the court does not wish to determine the
validity of Massachusetts same-sex marriages in other jurisdictions); Goodridge v.
Dep't of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 967 (Mass. 2003) (explaining that Massachusetts
would not presume to impose its legalization of same-sex marriage on other states);
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d. at 972 n.4 (Greaney, J., concurring) (stating Goodridge will
not be a tool to foist same-sex marriage upon other states).
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c) (2006).
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premacy inasmuch as it is a rule of inter-state marriage recognition-
which allows each state to decide for itself-declared and enacted into
law by a legislature. Congress enacted section two, and Congress's
legislative power to decide what "effects" a marriage in one state
would have in another state is explicitly established by Article IV of
the United States Constitution.43
Finally, with the failure of the arguments that DOMA is structu-
rally unconstitutional, some advocates for the recognition of same-sex
marriage have returned to more sweeping claims that DOMA is un-
constitutional under malleable substantive constitutional doctrines
such as religious establishment, association, equal protection, and
substantive due process principles. 44 These arguments will be popular
with those who favor the outcome that would result, but the arguments
are internally inconsistent and cannot stand on their own merits. While
there is not room for a full discussion of these claims in this Article,
which is devoted to structural constitutional issues, it suffices to note
that there is simply no credible basis in constitutional text, history, or
precedent for the claim that same-sex marriage is a fundamental right.
Neither the "deeply rooted in history" nor the "essential to the
concept of ordered liberty" test for identifying unwritten fundamental
rights entitled to special constitutional protection are satisfied.45
43. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, §1.
44. See Symposium, DOMA and Issues Concerning Federalism and Interstate
Recognition ofSame-Sex Relationships, 41 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (2010).
45. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). Here, the Su-
preme Court explained:
Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two pri-
mary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process
Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are,
objectively, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," and
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed." Second, we have required in
substantive-due-process cases a "careful description" of the asserted fun-
damental liberty interest. Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and prac-
tices thus provide the crucial "guideposts for responsible decisionmaking,"
that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause.
Id. (internal citations omitted). See also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-
23 (1989); Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502-03 (1977) (providing the test
for substantive due process); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) ("The
history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental con-
cern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents
2010] 155
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Adults who engage in alternative consensual sexual practices deserve
to be treated with respect for their human dignity, but not all personal
relationships "have 'played a critical role in the culture and traditions
of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and be-
liefs."' 46 Likewise, it is arguable that not all relationships make equal
contributions to the needs of society (as distinct from the desires of
particular individuals), which eliminates equality claims. For example,
the distinctive value of marriage in providing dual-gender parenting is
one example of many legally-cognizable differences between mar-
riage and same-sex unions that matters for society. Marriage is the on-
ly legal institution that directly links sexual relations with responsible
procreation, and with optimal parenting of children. While marriage
also serves important adult intimacy and relationship functions, the
parental dimension of marriage is deeply rooted in our legal and social
understanding of marriage. The fundamental rights and interests pro-
tected by marriage include children's rights to establish and maintain a
parental relationship with their own biological mothers and fathers.47
Every child deserves to be raised by a mother and father whenever
possible, and the biological parents have priority in parenting, unless
required otherwise to protect the child, both for their own sakes and
for the sake of the child. 48 In numerous constitutions, charters, and
conventions around the world, recognition of a state obligation to pro-
tect marriage and/or the family is clearly expressed.49 In American
constitutional law this notion is most often expressed in the context of
in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition.").
46. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dall., 493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990) (citing Roberts v.
U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984)) (holding that a voluntary business club
is not a protected intimate association). See also Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rota-
ry Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987) (declining to hold that the relationships
protected are limited to the family, but rejecting claim that a service club is pro-
tected).
47. See, e.g., Du Toit v. Minister of Welfare and Population Dev. 2003 (2) SA
198 (CC) at 22 (S. Afr.); C. Quince Hopkins, Variety in U.S. Kinship Practices,
Substantive Due Process Analysis and the Right to Marry, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 665,
676 (2004); Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children's Rights?, 80 MINN.
L. REv. 267, 281-82 (1995).
48. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000). See infra note 50
for further cases.
49. See infra Appendix § IV.B.
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"parents' rights," in which children's fundamental human rights to es-
tablish and maintain a parental relationship with their mother and fa-
ther, are imbedded unless an alternative arrangement is required to
protect the best interests of the child.o
Thus, it is not surprising that four district court decisions and one
federal court of appeals decision have rejected claims that DOMA is
unconstitutional." However, that unanimity of federal court decisions
was broken in July 2010 when Massachusetts Federal District Judge
Tauro ruled in two separate suits that section three of DOMA violates
the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, the Tenth Amend-
ment, and federalism.5 2 However, both opinions' heavily tilted find-
ings of facts, feeble constitutional analysis, and conclusions of law are
completely inadequate and self-contradictory. As Yale Law Professor
Jack Balkin explained: "'What an amazing set of opinions[.]' . . . 'No
chance they'll be held up on appeal.' . . . 'These two opinions are at
war with themselves[.]"' 5 3 For example, Gill v. Office of Personal
50. See e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of the
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-66 (1943); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
51. See Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 686 (9th Cir. 2006), aff'g 374
F. Supp. 2d 861 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (affirming the district court's dismissal of a sec-
tion two claim, rejecting equal protection and due process claims, and remanding to
dismiss a section three claim on the merits); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298,
1303-09 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (finding DOMA does not violate the Full Faith and Cre-
dit, Equal Protection, or Due Process Clauses); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 131-48
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (finding DOMA does not violate, inter alia, the Fifth
Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal protection, or the Tenth Amend-
ment's reservation to the states of the power to regulate marriage); see also Order
Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 7, Smelt v. United States, No. 8:09-cv-
00286-DoC-MLG (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/19079566/Order-Dismissing-Smelt-v-United-States-of-
America (dismissing DOMA challenge on jurisdictional grounds). But see In re Le-
venson, 560 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 2009) (Reinhardt, Cir. J.)
("There is no rational basis for denying benefits to the same-sex spouses of [federal
court-supervised] employees while granting them to the opposite-sex spous-
es .... .
52. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387 (D. Mass. 2010);
Massachusetts v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d
234, 249 (D. Mass. 2010) [hereinafter D.H.H.S.].
53. Abby Goodnough & John Schwartz, Judge Topples US Rejection of Gay
Unions, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2010/07/09/us/09marriage.html.
2010] 157
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Management5 4 held that the Equal Protection Clause requires same-
sex unions to be treated the same as marriages, implying that state re-
fusal to recognize same-sex marriages violates federal equal protec-
tion doctrine.55 This mocks the holding in Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts v. United States Department of Health and Human Services
("D.H.H.S.") 56 that only the states-and not the federal government-
have valid constitutional interests in regulating marriage.5 ' The hold-
ing in D.H.H.S. that only states may regulate marriage flies in the face
of not only centuries of federal law, but also of the court's insistence
in Gill that the Equal Protection Clause commands recognition of
same-sex marriage." Arguably, the credibility of the judgments was
undermined for several reasons: the district court, in an "Alice-in-
Wonderland" judicial moment, brushed aside all differences between
conjugal marriages and same-sex relationships; Judge Tauro was pain-
fully unpersuasive in his attempt to ignore the long history of federal
preemption of state marriage law for purposes of federal programs;
and he desperately focused on "straw man" equality arguments.
However, the prospects on appeal are uncertain because the Unit-
ed States Department of Justice played politics when they defended
DOMA at the trial court level. The Department of Justice deliberately
conceded critical factual points and declined to assert legal arguments
that had been successful in previous DOMA litigation. 59 If the Obama
Justice Department continues to refuse to present a credible, let alone
zealous, defense of DOMA, it is possible that Judge Tauro's feeble
and flawed judgments may not be corrected. However, this would be
due to politics, not the law.
54. 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010).
55. Id. at 396-97.
56. 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010).
57. Id. at 249.
58. See Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d. at 396-97; D.H.H.S., 698 F. Supp. 2d. at 249.
59. See, e.g., A Defense ofFairness Act, WASHINGTON POST, July 11, 2010, at
Al6, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2010/07/10/AR2010071002534_pf.html (even the Washington Post called the Ob-
ama Justice Department defense of DOMA "tepid" and noted concessions by the
government lawyers).
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III. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE RECOGNITION UNDER SECTION Two OF
DOMA IN INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE
CONFLICTS ANALYSIS
A brief primer on marriage recognition provides some context for
the interstate comparative conflicts analysis. "[I]n the United States,
the approach to 'applicable law' issues in the entire family law area
has been left almost completely to the individual states and . .. there is
no 'federal' conflicts rule on these issues for marriage or divorce."60
As to the "validity of a marriage in the United States, it is state law
that determines the applicable law," just as the direct regulation of
substantive domestic relations have been left entirely to the states.6 1
Traditionally, the ubiquitous rule regarding marriage recognition fol-
lowed in all of the American states has been some variation of lex loci
delicti, meaning that marriages that are valid in the state where per-
formed are recognized as valid in other states too, unless they violate
some strong public policy of the other state.62 That approach is still the
general American marriage recognition standard; however, some
states follow variations of the governmental interest analysis, where
the application of the test generally focuses on the "contacts" with the
states, and the states "interests" in having their marriage law govern
the question. 63 Ordinarily, "the regulatory interests and values of the
community of which the couple is a part"64 should be respected at
both the celebration and recognition stages of marriage. 65 But those
comity interests can be, and historically have been, preempted when
the marriage violates the state's strongly-held fundamental policy val-
ues regarding proposed recognition of controversial domestic relation-
60. Silberman, supra note 30, at 2001.
61. Id.
62. See L. Lynn Hogue, State Common-Law Choice-of-Law Doctrine and
Same-Sex "Marriage": How Will States Enforce the Public Policy Exception?, 32
CREIGHTON L. REv. 29, 31-32 (1998); articles cited supra note 32.
63. Silberman, supra note 30, at 2001.
64. Linda J. Silberman, Can the Island ofHawaii Bind the World? A Comment
on Same-Sex Marriage and Federalism Values, 16 QUINNiPIAC L. REv. 191, 203
(1996).
65. See Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage: Refining the Conflict of Laws
Analysis, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2195, 2214 (2005); articles cited supra note 29.
1592010]
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A. Same-Sex Marriage Recognition Under Section Two of DOMA
in Interstate Comparative Conflicts Analysis
How many states have recognized, and now do recognize, same-
sex marriages validly contracted in other states? How many other
states are likely to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed in
other states? How many states have constitutional, statutory, or case
law that withholds recognition to same-sex marriages validly per-
formed in other states?
The answer to the first question is factual and clear: as Appendix,
Section I.A shows, same-sex marriage is allowed in only five of the
fifty states, the District of Columbia (but none of the other dozen fed-
eral territories), 67 and one of the 564 federally-recognized American
Indian tribes.68 It would be difficult in most cases to argue that recog-
66. Wardle, Slavery, supra note 38, at 1908-09.
67. The District of Columbia is the 27th largest city in America. Infoplease,
Top 50 Cities in the U.S. by Population and Rank, http://www.infoplease.com/
ipa/A0763098.html (last visited Jul. 21, 2010). The five major territories adminis-
tered as insular territories of the United States include American Samoa, Northern
Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam. Office of Insular
Affairs, U.S Dep't of the Interior, All OIA Jurisdictions (2007),
http://www.doi.gov/oia/Firstpginfo/islandfactsheet.htm (last visited Jul. 21, 2010).
The Guam Senate considered a bill to legalize same-sex civil unions in 2010. See
Guam Senator defends same sex civil union bill, SOLOMON STAR, Jan. 21, 2010,
available at http://www.solomonstarnews.com/news/regional/2119-guam-senator-
defends-same-sex-civil-union-bill. Seven other minor islands are also administered
as territories (Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Kingman
Reef, Navassa Island and Palmyra Atoll). Office of Insular Affairs, U.S Dep't of the
Interior, U.S. Territories Under U.S. Fish and Wildlife Jurisdiction or Shared with
Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) (2007),
http://www.doi.gov/oia/Firstpginfo/islandfactsheet2.htm (last visited Jul. 21, 2010).
68. Julie Bushyhead, The Coquille Indian Tribe, Same-Sex Marriage, and
Spousal Benefits: A Practical Guide, 26 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 509, 509 (2009)
(stating the Coquille Tribe is the first and only Indian tribe to allow same-sex mar-
riage). See also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Same-Sex Marriage, Indian Tribes, and the
Constitution, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 53 (2006) (discussing the impact of a same-sex
marriage amendment on the Indian tribes). For the number of federally-recognized
Indian tribes, see Bureau of Indian Affairs, Dep't of the Interior, Indian Entities
Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of In-
dian Affairs, 74 Fed. Reg. 40218 (Aug. 11, 2009), available at
18
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nizing same-sex marriage violates the strong public policy of a forum
state if the forum state has internally legalized the creation of same-
sex marriages. Therefore, it is likely that the five states, which have
legalized same-sex marriage, will recognize same-sex marriages per-
formed in other jurisdictions. 69
Five other states have created same-sex civil unions with all or
most of the incidents and benefits of marriage.70 It is very unlikely that
these states will recognize same-sex marriages validly performed in
other states as "marriages" because the differences between marriage
and civil unions are very important in these states, important enough
for them to draw a very clear distinction. However, it is very likely
these states will treat foreign same-sex marriages the same as civil un-
ions by giving them the same status as civil unions in those states, or
by giving the parties all of the same rights and benefits accorded to
same-sex civil unions in these states.
On the other hand, and to answer the third question above, thirty
states have adopted constitutional amendments specifically intended
to protect marriage as the union of a man and a woman by explicitly
defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman.71 Nineteen of
these thirty states' substantive amendments also expressly prohibit
marriage-equivalent same-sex civil unions.72 However, three of these
thirty states that have constitutionally prohibited same-sex marriage
(California, Oregon and Nevada) have legalized same-sex civil un-
ions,73 leaving thirteen states still in play. Given these states' clear
constitutional stance against same-sex marriage, it would be very dif-
ficult for their courts to credibly conclude that it would not violate
strong public policy to recognize a same-sex marriage validly per-
formed in another state. Thus, it is not surprising that interstate same-
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/biaind.pdf (including entities of Alaskan Native
Americans).
69. There may be non-recognition by these states in at least some circums-
tances, such as evasive marriages by residents of the forum state, and other rules
such as regulations of age of marriage, close relationship, etc. See generally Andrew
Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L.
REv. 921 (1998).
70. See infra Appendix § I.B.
71. See infra Appendix § II.A.
72. See infra Appendix § II.B.
73. See infra Appendix § I.B.
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sex marriage recognition claims in those thirty states have failed.74
What remains are thirteen "bleeding Kansas"-type "border states"
that have neither adopted amendments rejecting same-sex marriage,
nor legalized same-sex marriage or same-sex civil unions." It is in
these states (including prominently New York, Maryland, and Rhode
Island) where the battle over recognition of sister-state same-sex mar-
riages has raged, is raging, and will continue to rage, and which con-
flict of laws scholars find the most interesting. It is likely that in some
of these "border states," same-sex marriage will not be recognized as
marriages generally, but will be recognized as marriages for specific
purposes, such as eligibility for particular benefits or programs, as
they have been in New York.76 It is likely that these remaining thir-
74. See Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (citing state
marriage amendment in declining to recognize Vermont same-sex civil union for
custody purposes); Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 181-84 (Conn. App. Ct.
2002) (affirming refusal to recognize Vermont Civil Unions prior to Connecticut le-
galizing same-sex marriage or civil unions). Compare Knight v. Super. Ct., 26 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 687, 690-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding state-initiated law (Prop. 22),
which prohibited recognition of same-sex marriage, also applies to in-state marriag-
es and out-of-state marriages), with Armijo v. Miles, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 623, 636-38
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding Prop. 22 applies to out-of-state marriages, but not to
in-state marriages), andIn re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008) (hold-
ing Prop 22 applies to in-state marriages and out-of-state marriages, but it is uncons-
titutional under the state constitution), overturned by Proposition 8 (November 4,
2008), amendment upheld by Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 119 (Cal. 2009) (find-
ing Proposition 8 to be valid). See also Bishop v. Oklahoma, No. 06-5188, 2009 WL
1566802, at *4 (10th Cir. 2009) (dismissing claims against state officials alleging
unconstitutionality of state marriage amendment). But see Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
No. C 09-2292, 2010 WL 3025614, at *66-69 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2010) (finding Cal-
ifornia's constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage to be "irrational" and
violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses).
75. The thirteen states are Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Min-
nesota, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. See infra Appendix §§ I.A., LB., II.A.
76. Compare Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp. of N.Y., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2003), rev'd, 802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477-80 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (holding
surviving partner of same-sex civil union could not bring wrongful death action),
appeal dismissed, 850 N.E.2d 672 (N.Y. 2006), with B.S. v. F.B., 883 N.Y.S.2d 458,
465-67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (recognizing Vermont civil union, but denying di-
vorce), and Godfrey v. Spano, 871 N.Y.S.2d 296, 299 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (af-
firming county executive's order directing recognition of same-sex marriages), aff'd
on other grounds, 920 N.E.2d 328, 334-35 (N.Y. 2009) (dismissing claims for lack
of standing and no improper expenditure of funds), and Lewis v. N.Y. State Dep't of
20
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teen "border states" will adopt or evolve substantive marriage policies
that will effectively settle the issue of whether same-sex marriages
created validly in sister states will be recognized. In the meantime, it
is also likely that choice of law principles will be creatively applied,
even twisted like a pretzel, to one or the other political end (recogni-
tion or non-recognition of same sex marriage).77
Many of these "border states" have currently adopted what might
be called mini-DOMA statutes, which define marriage as the union of
a man and woman.7 8 However, the impact of such statutes on inter-
state recognition of same-sex marriage is uncertain. For instance,
these statutes can be repealed at any time by state legislatures. For ex-
ample, in 2009 the New Hampshire legislature, which previously
adopted a statute protecting marriage as a male-female union,79 re-
pealed that statute by adopting legislation legalizing same-sex mar-
Civil Serv., 872 N.Y.S.2d 578, 584 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (affirming department's
recognition of same-sex marriages as valid where performed because not abhorrent
to New York public policy), aff'd on other grounds, Godfrey v. Spano, 920 N.E.2d
328, 337 (N.Y. 2009). See also Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 961-63 (R.I.
2007) (finding Rhode Island court lacked jurisdiction to grant divorce to a resident
same-sex couple married in Massachusetts); Kern v. Tanney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 5th
558, 563-76 (2010) (declining to allow a same-sex couple to divorce and rejecting
challenges to Pennsylvania statute forbidding same-sex marriage); Marriage -
Whether Out-of-State Same-Sex Marriage That is Valid in the State of Celebration
May be Recognized in Maryland, 95 Op. Att'y. Gen. Md. 3 (Feb. 23, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions/2010/95oag3.pdf [hereinafter Md. Att'y.
Gen.].
77. For a recent example of such outcome-driven legal gymnastics, see the re-
cent Maryland Attorney General Opinion that opines-for it is not binding on courts
or lawmakers or agencies-that same-sex marriages will be recognized in the state
notwithstanding a state statute that expressly defines marriage as the union of a man
and a woman. Md. Att'y. Gen, supra note 76.
78. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (2009); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/212
(West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1 (West 2008); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2009); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1704 (2001); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-603 (LexisNexis 2004); WYo.
STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (2009). See also HAW. REv. STAT. § 572-3 (2006) (supple-
menting structural constitutional amendment). Some other states have adopted both
constitutional and statutory protection for marriage by defining marriage as the un-
ion of a man and a woman. See generally ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX,
DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES 137-48
(2006); Wardle, Slavery, supra note 38, at 1911-14.
79. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1-3 (LexisNexis 2007) (repealed 2010).
1632010]
21
Wardle: Who Decides? The Federal Architecture of DOMA and Comparative Mar
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2010
164 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41
riage in the state.80
Likewise, the statutory protection can be overturned by a judicial
interpretation of the state constitution as mandating legalization of
same-sex marriage. For example, Iowa had a statute defining marriage
as the union of man and woman,81 which was held unconstitutional by
the Iowa Supreme Court in 2008 when that court mandated the legali-
zation of same-sex marriage. 82 Similarly, it may be determined that
the statutes fail to embody a strong state policy against recognition in
the state of same-sex marriages validly created in other jurisdictions.
The Maryland Attorney General recently suggested this interpretation
for the Maryland statute protecting the institution of marriage as a
male-female union.83
A state may recognize same-sex marriages validly created in other
states for general purposes of the forum state's domestic relations law,
or for only purposes of particular governmental benefits, incidents, or
privileges. These two types of recognition must be distinguished. This
distinction conforms to the pattern of foreign, validly-created, poly-
gamous marriages, which are not recognized for domestic relations
purposes, but have been recognized for success or inheritance purpos-
es.84
So at present, the "box score" is that five states are sure to fully
recognize same-sex marriage.85 Another five states will almost cer-
tainly give partial recognition to same-sex marriages (i.e. treat them
the same as civil unions).86 Another thirty states will not generally
recognize same-sex marriages, but may recognize them for purposes
of eligibility for particular benefits.87 Finally, to the great academic in-
terest of conflict of laws scholars, same-sex marriages are sure to be
hotly contested case-by-case in the near future in about a baker's doz-
80. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1-3 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2009).
81. IOWA CODE § 595.2 (2001).
82. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009).
83. Md. Att'y. Gen, supra note 76 (discussing, inter alia, MD. CODE ANN.
FAM. LAW § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2006)).
84. In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 188 P.2d 499, 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948);
Gibson v. Hughes, 192 F. Supp. 564, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
85. See discussion supra Part III.A, at p. 160.
86. Id.
87. See discussion supra Part III.A, at p. 161.
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en of the states, with unsure outcomes.88 These outcomes will be more
predictable on the basis of political analysis than choice of law prin-
ciples or analysis.
What this suggests is that the drafters of section two of DOMA
got it right. Section two protects state decision-making authority to re-
solve an issue that citizens and public officials in eighty percent of the
states have determined is of very great importance, and on which they
have taken a clear and strong policy (mostly state constitutional poli-
cy) position. It protects the authority of the remaining states to contin-
ue to wrestle with the issue and to determine the matter for them-
selves. It also protects the right of all of the states to modify, and even
overturn, their existing policies about same-sex marriage recognition
as public policy in the states evolves.
B. DOMA Section Two in Light ofInternational Comparative
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages
There are two predominant choice of law systems widely used for
international marriage recognition, concerning marriage essentials, in
the world today. 89 One is the rule of lex loci celebrationis (the law of
the place of celebration). 90 The other is the rule of personal law (the
law that defines the personal status of the parties). 91 The personal law
system is divided, in turn, into two competing rules for determining
personal law: lex patriae (the law of one's nationality) and lex domici-
lii (the law of one's domicile).92
"In most countries the substantive validity of marriages is tested
by the personal law rather than by the lex loci celebrationis."93 In
88. See discussion supra Part III.A, at pp. 161-162.
89. See generally Lynn D. Wardle, International Marriage and Divorce Regu-
lation and Recognition: A Survey, 29 FAM. L. Q. 497, 502-11 (1995) [hereinafter,
Wardle, Survey]. For questions of marriage formalities, lex loci celebrationis is the
predominant choice of law rule. Id. at 502-03.
90. LENNART PALSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS:
SUBSTANTIVE CONDITIONS 2 (1981) [hereinafter PALSSON].
91. Id.
92. Lennart PIlsson, Marriage and Divorce, in 3 PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 12, 58 (1978) [herei-
nafter IECL]; Phlsson, supra note 90, at 2.
93. IECL, supra note 92, at 60.
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most civil law countries, nationality has been the primary source of
personal law (lex patriae).94 This is the traditional choice of law rule
for marriage recognition "nearly everywhere in Continental Europe,"
as well as in most of the Arab world countries with western legal sys-
tems.95 The other personal law regime, lex domicilii, looks to the law
of the domicile and has been the rule for marriage recognition in the
United Kingdom, many British Commonwealth countries, and some
Latin American countries. 96 Globally, one trend is to use domicile,97
rather than nationality, to determine the law governing marriage ca-
pacity or essentials because of the desire to apply local law to labor
immigrants and their families, who often remain nationals of their
country of origin. 98
Nations that follow the lex loci celebrationis principle as to subs-
tantive marriage requirements include the United States, several Latin
American countries, 99 and Scandinavian countries inter se.100 In these
nations, a marriage that is valid under the law of the place of celebra-
tion is valid in the forum, unless it violates the strong public policy of
the forum.'o'
Under both the personal law and lex loci celebrationis regimes of
94. Id. at 68 ("[T]he rule of lex patriae prevails in the majority of countries
adhering to the system of the personal law. . .
95. PALSSON, supra note 90, at 90.
96. IECL, supra note 92, at 69 & nn.395-96 (noting the use of lex domicilii in
England, Scotland, Australia, Canada, Quebec, New Zealand, and Brazil). See also
PALSSON, supra note 90, 91 & n.290, 92 (stating that lex domicilii applied in Eng-
land, Scotland, Australia, Canada, Quebec, New Zealand, and Brazil; Venezuela
used the test of nationality, and Peru and Sweden used mixed systems); Barbara E.
Graham-Siegenthaler, Principles of Marriage Recognition Applied to Same-Sex
Marriage Recognition in Switzerland and Europe, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 121, 137
(1998) (stating that lex domicilii is the choice-of-law in the UK, Greece, Portugal,
and to an extent Ireland).
97. "Habitual residence" is another term sometimes used today to refer to do-
micile.
98. See Michael Bodgan & Eva Ryrstedt, Marriage in Swedish Family Law
and Swedish Conflicts ofLaw, 29 FAM. L.Q. 675, 679-80 (1995).
99. Jae M. Lee, Recognition of International Marriages in Argentina, 29 FAM.
L.Q. 519, 523 (1995); IECL, supra note 92, at 59 (noting that in Latin America, the
lex loci celebrationis rule is usually subject to numerous exceptions in the case of
foreign marriages).
100. PALSSON, supra note 90, at 83.
101. IECL, supra note 92, at 59.
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private international law, foreign marriages that would otherwise be
recognized under the choice of law rule will not be recognized if they
violate the ordre public exception in choice of law: If a strong public
policy of the forum is violated then a marriage that was valid in
another country where performed will not be recognized. 10 2
The ordre public exception is especially important in nations that
follow the lex loci celebrationis rule because it is easier for residents
to evade local marriage laws. Restrictive policies of the residence state
may be evaded by simply crossing a border to celebrate the marriage,
and then returning to the restrictive state to live. Thus, lex loci cele-
brationis countries generally refuse to recognize evasive marriages of
their own citizens.1 0 3
Today, same-sex marriage is generally allowed in only nine world
nations,' 04 which is less than five percent of the world's 192 sovereign
nations. Same-sex civil unions,105 which are similar to traditional mar-
riages, are permitted in an additional twelve nations.1 06 Same-sex mar-
riage is banned in nearly ninety percent of the world's nations, and at
least thirty-five nations have constitutional provisions defining mar-
riage as a male-female union.107
Marriage between a man and a woman is a pre-state institution,
meaning that it existed before there were states. 08 It is the most bene-
102. Wardle, Survey, supra note 89, at 506. See also PALSSON, supra note 90,
at 10-50.
103. See Wardle, Survey, supra note 89, at 506.
104. See infra Appendix § III.A. Same-sex marriage is permitted in some ci-
ties or states in a few other nations including the United States and Mexico, but not
throughout the nation. Id.
105. Same-sex unions are called by many different labels, including domestic
partnerships, civil unions, pactes civiles, etc.
106. See infra Appendix § III.B.
107. See infra Appendix § IV.A.
108. See generally JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 362 (Peter
Laslett, ed., 1963) ("The first society was between man and wife . . . ."); Katherine
Shaw Spaht, Covenant Marriage Seven Years Later: Its As Yet Unfulfilled Promise,
65 LA. L. REV. 605, 612 (2005) (describing marriage as the oldest social institution);
Bill Muehlenberg, Marriage as a Universal Norm, NATIONAL MARRIAGE
COALITION, http://www.marriage.org.au/index.php? option=com content&view
=article&id=22&Itemid=24 (last visited Oct. 12, 2010) ("Marriage is also the norm,
both universal and historical."); see also id. ("Writing in 1938, Stanford University
psychologist Lewis Terman opened his book on marital happiness with these words:
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ficial form of an intimate relationship. Marriage is the original and ul-
timate basis for all other social relations, and the basic social unit
upon which all other social organizations, including complex social
organizations like the state, exist.109 That is why the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights declares and explicitly protects the right of
men and women to marry, to enjoy equal rights within marriage as ba-
sic human rights," 0 and links the importance of marriage directly to
the family. "The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of
society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.""'
Constitutions in eighteen percent of the sovereign nations of the
world contain explicit provisions defining or describing marriage as a
dual-gender union of a man and a woman.11 2 This may be interpreted
to reflect the recognition of the dual-gender union's primary and es-
sential importance to society, and to the state of marriage. By contrast,
there are no world nations that have explicitly protected same-sex
marriage in their constitutions, and only two national constitutions
'Marriage is one of the most nearly universal of human institutions. No other touch-
es so intimately the life of practically every member of the earth's population.' And
more recent studies arrive at similar findings. Dr Helen Fisher, anthropologist at the
American Museum of Natural History, puts it this way: 'Marriage is a cultural uni-
versal; it predominates in every society in the world.' American sociologist Kingsley
Davis concurs: 'Although the details of getting married-who chooses mates, what
are the ceremonies and exchanges, how old are the parties-vary from group to
group, the principle of marriage is everywhere embodied in practice . . .. No matter
how bizarre or peculiar the marriage customs of a given society, they are still recog-
nizable as marriage customs."').
109. See sources cited supra note 108; infra notes 110-112 and accompanying
text; see also Steven K. Homer, Note, Against Marriage, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 505, 506, 515-19 (1994) (acknowledging it is commonly claimed that marriage
is a pre-state institution, but critiquing that as a justification for dual-gender
marriage).
110. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, at art. 16(1) (Dec. 12, 1948).
111. Id. at art. 16(3). Similarly, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Is-
lam, adopted in 1990 by the 45 nations then belonging to the Organization of the Is-
lamic Conference, also provides that: "The family is the foundation of society, and
marriage is the basis of its formation. Men and women have the right to mar-
riage...." Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam, Aug. 5, 1990, G.A. Res. No.
49/19-P, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.157/PC/62/Add.18 (June 9, 1993). See also id. at
art. 6 (discussing equality of men and women).
112. See infra Appendix § IV.A.
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have been interpreted to require legalization of same-sex marriage.' 13
As a matter of ordinary application of private international law,
most same-sex marriages would fail the ordinary rules for foreign
marriage recognition. For example, most nations apply the personal
law regime for marriage recognition, and do not allow same-sex mar-
riage. If a citizen or domiciliary of such a nation were to go to a coun-
try that allowed same-sex marriage and enter into such a union there,
then under simple principles of private international law, no jurisdic-
tion following lex patria or lex domicilii would recognize that mar-
riage as valid. Such marriages would be treated as an evasive marriage
not allowed in his or her country.
Additionally, all nations appear to have an ordre public or public
policy exception to their general choice of law or private international
law rules for marriage recognition.1 4 Thus, even if recognition of a
same-sex marriage were appropriate under the general or specific
rules of private international law, it would not be recognized if same-
sex marriage was deemed to be deeply offensive to the public order or
policy of the forum. Whether same-sex marriage would be deemed to
violate the ordre public would depend upon the domestic law of the
country in which recognition is sought. However, under general prin-
ciples of private international law applicable to marriage recognition,
it is clear that only those nine nations that allow same-sex marriage"15
would definitely hold that recognition of a foreign same-sex marriage
does not violate the domestic public policy.
This issue is uncertain in nations that recognize same-sex unions,
which are like marriages. The differences between marriage qua mar-
riage and civil unions or domestic partnerships are strong enough that
internally such nations allow the latter but do not allow same-sex mar-
riages. Therefore, it is unlikely that they would recognize same-sex
marriages from other nations as "marriages" either. These unions may
not be recognized as marriages, but foreign same-sex marriage
couples may receive the benefits extended by local law to same-sex
domestic partnerships or even receive the status of such domestic
partnerships.
113. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC) (S. Afr.);
Halpern v. Toronto, [2003] 225 D.L.R. 529 (Can.).
114. Wardle, Survey, supra note 89, at 510.
115. See infra Appendix § III.A.
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Thus, it seems probable that under general principles of private in-
ternational law, same-sex marriages will only be recognized generally,
and fully as marriages, in nine of the world's 192 nations at this time
(and perhaps also in a few other cities, provinces, or states). Nations
that allow some kind of civil unions may give marriage status to same-
sex marriages contracted in another nation, or the benefits associated
with that status. However, it is unlikely that they would be fully rec-
ognized as marriages since these nations' internal laws do not allow
same-sex marriage and have drawn a clear distinction. Under the most
favorable but implausible prospects, in only eleven percent of the na-
tions is there a possibility that same-sex marriage will be fully or par-
tially recognized under prevailing private international law principles
of marriage recognition. Of course, nations, which do not or will not
allow same-sex marriage, or give general marriage recognition to
same-sex marriages, may recognize valid foreign same-sex marriages
for specific purposes, such as for eligibility of specific government
benefits. 116
Specific treaties or conventions could change the basis for interna-
tional recognition of same-sex marriages, but to date none have done
so. Within the European community specifically, and potentially with-
in the European Union generally, some conventions governing mar-
riage recognition, family rights, civil status, and travel in other mem-
ber countries have the potential of increasing the chances for
recognition of same-sex marriages from one member European coun-
try in another. However, as of now, those are largely theoretical possi-
bilities and not legal realities.!17 Thus, as one European legal scholar
116. HCJ 3045/05 Ben-Ari & others v. Dir. of Population Admin., Ministry of
the Interior (2) IsrLR 283 [2006] (Isr.), available at http://elyonl.court.
gov.il/fileseng/05/450/030/a09/05030450.a09.htm (allowing registration of same-
sex marriage couples from Canada as "married" on ground that such registration was
relevant only for statistical purposes and not dispositive of the validity of the Israeli
marriages); Fragomen Global, Family Members Generally, in GLOBAL BusINEss
IMMIGRATION HANDBOOK § 8:29, 12:30 (2010) (explaining that temporary entry to
same-sex partners is granted in Germany; and designated activities status is granted
to same-sex partners in Japan).
117. See Katharina Boele-Woelki, The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Rela-
tionships Within the European Union, 82 TUL. L. REv. 1949, 1968-74 (2008); Alli-
son R. O'Neill, Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage in the European Community:
The European Court ofJustice's Ability to Dictate Social Policy, 37 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 199, 200-01 (2004); Judith Faucette, Same Sex Marriage and Free Movement in
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wrote:
[Currently the recognition of same-sex marriage within member
states] all left to national legislatures and courts . . . . [T]raditional
concepts are applied: in those countries which allow couples to le-
gally formalize their same-sex relationship, the rules require that
the couple must either (1) have their residence in the state of cele-
bration or (2) not face an impediment to such a relationship accord-
ing to their national law or the law of their habitual residence. Thus,
Spanish nationals can conclude their same-sex marriage in the
Netherlands if one of them has his or her habitual residence in that
country. In particular, the transformation of a foreign institution in-
to the 'local' institution (adapted recognition) expresses how tradi-
tionally but carefully the recognition issue is solved, not to mention
those states that do not recognize a relationship formalized abroad
because their national family laws prevent same-sex couples from
obtaining any legal status.118
At present, there is one international convention that specifies
marriage recognition rules called the Hague Convention on Celebra-
tion and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages.1 19 It avoids most
inter-jurisdictional recognition issues by providing for strict front-end
requirements, which the parties must meet before their marriage can
be created in a particular jurisdiction.' 2 0 As a general rule, the Hague
Marriage Convention provides that a marriage properly celebrated in a
member jurisdiction, meeting certain minimum essential requirements,
must be recognized by all other contracting states.' 2 1 However, even
this convention contains an ordre public exception, which allows na-
tions to refuse to recognize the marriage if it is strongly against state
public policy.12 2 More importantly, only three nations have ratified
the EU: Immigration and Benefits for Gay Families Based on European Law,
SurrE1O1.COM, June 1, 2009, http://marital-gender-equality.suitel01.com/ ar-
ticle.cfm/same sex marriage and ree movement in the eu.
118. Boele-Woelki, supra note 117, at 1977-78 (footnote omitted).
119. Hague Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of
Marriages, arts. 7-15, Mar. 14, 1978, 16 I.L.M 18 [hereinafter Hague Marriage Con-
vention].
120. Id. at arts. 3-6, 11, 14.
121. Id. at art. 14.
122. Id.
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this convention since the Hague Conference of Private International
Law officially proposed it; thus, it is effectively "dead-letter" as inter-
national law.' 23
There are also bilateral treaties between the United States and oth-
er countries that may have specific provisions regarding marriage; at
least one could have implications for marriage recognition. 124 Howev-
er, those are very rare, so they are of limited comparative law signific-
ance.
Thus, section two of DOMA is consistent with international mar-
riage recognition rules and principles. It harmonizes well with global
marriage recognition theories and practices. International comparative
conflict of laws analysis vindicates the policies embodied in DOMA.
IV. VERTICAL FEDERALISM AND THE STRUCTURAL IMPORTANCE OF
SECTION THREE OF DOMA
Section three of DOMA added 1 U.S.C. § 7, which defined mar-
riage as "only a legal union between one man and one woman as hus-
band and wife" for purposes of federal law.' 25 As a result, for purpos-
es of interpreting federal laws, federal regulations, and rulings made
by federal agencies, the terms "marriage" and "spouse" do not include
same-sex unions. 126 Section three of DOMA defines what those terms
mean for purposes of federal law only, and does not impose those de-
finitions upon any state.' 2 7 It does not attempt to create, define, or re-
gulate domestic relations law; it only regulates the scope of applica-
tion of federal laws and programs.12 8 It does protect federal laws and
programs from having state domestic relations laws recognizing same-
sex marriage forced upon federal law.' 29 If a state chooses to legalize
123. Id. See also The Hague Marriage Convention, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Sept. 2007), http://www.hcch.net/upload/ out-
line26e.pdf (only Australia, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands are parties to the
Marriage Convention).
124. See, e.g., Agreement on Marriage: Documentary Requirements for United
States Citizens in Italy, U.S.-Italy, Mar. 26, 1966, 18 U.S.T. 342.
125. DOMA, supra note 1.
126. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
127. See DOMA, supra note 1.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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same-sex marriage within its own jurisdiction (as it still may), section
three provides that this state policy choice does not force federal offi-
cials or agencies to use that definition of marriage in interpreting or
administering federal programs and laws.
Likewise, section three of DOMA does not prevent Congress from
choosing to recognize same-sex marriage when it chooses to do so.
Indeed, bills are currently pending in Congress that, inter alia, would
recognize same-sex marriage for some or all purposes of federal
law.' 30 DOMA simply preserves that policy decision for Congress-
the elected representative body that was created by the Constitution to
make such decisions. 13 ' Thus, section three of DOMA also has a sig-
nificant "separation of powers" component. It is designed to protect
Congressional authority to control and govern policy decisions, such
as when federal law will consider same-sex marriages to be marriages
for purposes of federal laws, against usurpation by the executive or
judicial branches.
As explained in greater detail elsewhere, the argument that Con-
gress lacks the power to define "marriage," as that term is used in fed-
eral law, is meritless.13 2 The definition of legislative terms for the in-
ternal law of a jurisdiction is undeniably a proper function of any
legislature. Congress has the power, which it has exercised for two
centuries, to define terms used in federal law-including terms of
marriage and family relationships.' 33 Not infrequently, Congress has
defined domestic relationship terms (including marriage) in ways in-
consistent with some states' definitions of those domestic relation-
130. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. Other bills are also pending
in Congress that impact state regulation of domestic relationships. See Military Rea-
diness Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. 1283, 111th Cong. § 3 (1st Sess. 2009) (pro-
posing to amend title ten by replacing the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Poli-
cy); Freedom From Credit and Discrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 4376, 111th Cong.
§ 2 (1st Sess. 2009) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
and gender in credit matters); The Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 2981,
111th Cong. § 2, 4 (1st Sess. 2009) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation and gender identity).
131. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § § 1, 8. See also U.S. CONST. art. IV. It would be iron-
ic indeed if Congress could set the terms regulating recognition of same-sex mar-
riages from one state to another, but not for purposes of federal law.
132. See Wardle, Section Three, supra note 2 (providing a detailed discussion
of section three of DOMA and these issues).
133. Id.
1732010]
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ships. For example, some states recognize immigration marriages
(marriages for the purpose of facilitating immigration) as valid (or
merely voidable) marriages. 134 But Congress amended the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Act to clarify that such marriages are not valid
for purposes of immediate relative priority in federal immigration
law.'35 Thus, a couple married for immigration purposes may have a
valid state marriage, yet they are not considered married for the pur-
pose of federal visa preference. 136
Likewise, Congress established a taxation system giving personal
benefits to married couples based on the federal law's definition of
marriage for federal taxes. Often, the state meaning of marriage is in-
corporated into the federal tax laws as a matter of federal choice, but
that is not always the case. For example, persons married under state
law, but legally separated, are not treated as married for federal in-
come tax law.137 A couple who consistently obtains a divorce at the
end of the year for single status on their tax filings, but remarries early
the following year, will be considered married even if they are deemed
unmarried under state domestic relations laws. 138
Similarly, in bankruptcy law, it is well established that "what con-
stitutes alimony, maintenance, or support will be determined under the
[federal] bankruptcy laws, not state law."l 39 Thus, a long line of sta-
tutes and cases involving federal programs have rejected application
134. Id. See generally Appeal of O'Rourke, 246 N.W.2d 461, 463 (Minn.
1976); Kleinfield v. Veruki, 372 S.E.2d 407, 410 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
135. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(2)(A) (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e) (2006).
136. See Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 617 (1953); id. at 620-21
(Jackson, J., dissenting); Garcia-Jaramillo v. Immig. & Natural. Servs., 604 F.2d
1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 1979).
137. I.R.C. § 7703(a)(2), (b) (2006) (providing definitions of marital status);
I.R.C. § 71(b) (2006) (providing definition of alimony).
138. Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40. See generally Linda D. Elrod & Ro-
bert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law 2007-2008: Federalization
and Nationalization Continue, 42 FAM. L.Q. 713, 714-15 (2009).
139. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 364 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 6319, cited with approval in In re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902, 905 (11th Cir. 1985).
See also In re Williams, 703 F.2d 1055, 1056 (8th Cir. 1983) ("Whether a particular
debt is a support obligation or part of a property settlement is a question of federal
bankruptcy law, not state law."); Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir.
1984) (stating bankruptcy courts look to federal law, not state law, to determine
whether an obligation is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support).
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of state community property law (part of domestic relations law).140
It has long been legally established that the meaning of family re-
lationship terms used in federal statutes are governed by Congress, not
by state lawmakers; Congress may, and usually chooses to, incorpo-
rate state domestic relations law into federal law; but if there is a con-
flict, federal law will preempt state domestic relations law for purpos-
es of federal law. For example, disputes under the Federal Homestead
Act over family succession to, or ownership of, an interest in the ho-
mestead property have been governed by federal law for nearly two
centuries. In the 1905 case of McCune v. Essig,141 a mother and
daughter disputed land settled by the father/husband under the homes-
tead law.142 The Supreme Court rejected application of state law be-
cause "[t]he words of the [federal Homestead Act] statute are clear,"
and even though contrary to state law, were controlling on the issue. 143
Citing cases going back to 1839, the Court rejected the daughter's
claim that under state law she was entitled to a share of the homes-
teaded property. The Court reasoned:
[The daughter's claim is] but another way of asserting the law of
the state against the law of the United States, and imposing a limita-
tion upon the title of the widow which § 2291 of the Revised Sta-
tutes does not impose. It may be that appellant's contention has
support in some expressions in the state decisions. If, however, they
may be construed as going to the extent contended for, we are una-
140. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 854 (1997) (holding that pensions are
governed under ERISA, not community property law); Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S.
581, 594-95 (1989) (finding veteran's disability partial waiver of military retirement
under USFSPA controls, not community property law); McCarty v. McCarty, 453
U.S. 210, 235-36 (1981) (ruling that military retirement pay is governed by federal
law, not community property law), superseded by statute, Uniformed Services For-
mer Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA), 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (2008); Hisquidero v.
Hisquidero, 439 U.S. 572, 583-86 (1979) (ruling railroad retirement assets are go-
verned by federal law, not community property law); Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S.
306, 311 (1964) (finding that U.S. Savings Bonds are governed by federal law, not
community property law, unless dealing with fraud); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S.
655, 658-59 (1950) (ruling that National Service Life Insurance Act governs benefi-
ciaries of policies, and community property laws do not). See generally Wardle, Sec-
tion Three, supra note 2.
141. 199 U.S. 382 (1905).
142. Id. at 386.
143. Id. at 389.
2010] 175
33
Wardle: Who Decides? The Federal Architecture of DOMA and Comparative Mar
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2010
176 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41
ble to accept them as controlling.144
Federal courts generally follow a presumption that federal law is
not intended to preempt state domestic relations law out of respect for
the states' residual constitutional power to regulate domestic rela-
tions.14 5 As the Supreme Court noted in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdol46:
"On the rare occasion when state family law has come into conflict
with a federal statute, this Court has limited review under the Supre-
macy Clause to a determination whether Congress has 'positively re-
quired by direct enactment' that state law be pre-empted."l 47 Like-
wise, in McCarty v. McCarty,148 the Court reiterated that "[s]tate
family and family-property law must do 'major damage' to 'clear and
substantial' federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will de-
mand that state law be overridden." 49 Congressional authority to su-
persede and displace state domestic relations law when domestic rela-
tions terms are used in federal law is clear; if there is any dispute the
question is usually whether Congress's intent to preempt is clear. In
fact, congressional intent to preempt state law was found in both His-
quierdo and McCune; the Court concluded that the federal law go-
verning family members' interests in federal benefits superseded the
otherwise applicable state domestic relations law.150
144. Id. at 390. See also Bernier v. Bernier, 147 U.S. 242, 246-47 (1893). But
see Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. 498 517-18 (1839) (providing that after title under
federal law passes and is established under federal law, then its conveyance and re-
lated ownership questions are governed by state law).
145. See generally Wardle, Section Three, supra note 2.
146. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
147. Id. at 581 (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904)).
148. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
149. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 220 (1981) (quoting Hisquierdo, 439
U.S. at 581). Moreover, "'[a] mere conflict in words is not sufficient'; the question
remains whether the 'consequences [of that community property right] sufficiently
injure the objectives of the federal program to require nonrecognition."' Id. at 232
(quoting Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 581-83). Additionally, Justice Rehnquist noted in
his dissent that he could find only five instances in which that kind of preemption
(forcing federal standards upon state law) occurred in the history of community
property disposition. Id. at 238 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
150. See McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382, 389-90 (1905); Hisquierdo, 439 U.S.
at 590.
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V. CONCLUSION: THE ARCHITECTURE OF FEDERALISM AND THE
FEDERAL ARCHITECTURE OF DOMA
DOMA is an architectural provision protecting the architecture of
federalism, and the structure of purposely-separated governmental au-
thority. It protects federalism by protecting the constitutional alloca-
tion of authority to set public policy regarding recognition of same-sex
marriage in two respects, for two specific units of government.
Section two of DOMA protects the authority of the states to de-
fine and recognize domestic relationships within their own borders by
allowing states to determine whether to recognize same-sex marriages
performed in other states. First, it protects each state from aggressive
sister-states that seek to export their same-sex marriages into the law,
policy, and territorial jurisdiction of other states. In doing so, an ag-
gressive state bypasses the approval of the elected policy-makers who
represent the people of the effected state. Second, it protects each state
from aggressive federal judges, and other governmental officials, who
would use the supremacy of federal law to force states to recognize
same-sex marriage in their internal domestic relations laws. Thus, sec-
tion two of DOMA protects the right of each state to decide for itself
whether, when, and to what extent it will or will not recognize same-
sex marriages created in other states.
Additionally, section three of DOMA protects congressional au-
thority to determine whether same-sex marriages created in the states
will be treated like marriages for purposes of federal laws, rules, and
regulations in two ways. First, it protects Congress against aggressive
states and state officials who seek to export same-sex marriage recog-
nition into federal law, policy, and programs, without congressional
approval. Second, it protects Congress from aggressive federal judges
and executive branch officials who may use their power to force the
recognition of state-created same-sex marriages into federal programs,
policies, and laws, without congressional approval. Section three pre-
serves the authority of Congress to decide the question of whether to
recognize state created same-sex marriages in federal laws.
The threatening conditions that caused Congress to enact DOMA
fourteen years ago-to protect state and congressional authority to de-
cide the marriage recognition question for their own sovereign juris-
dictions-have not disappeared, but are instead more threatening than
ever. No state had yet legalized same-sex marriage in 1996; today,
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five states and the District of Columbia have legalized same-sex mar-
riage. Therefore, those six jurisdictions create same-sex marriages that
are exported to other states (when same-sex couples move from one
state to another). Further, in 1996, no American court had yet ruled
that same-sex marriages performed in one state had to be recognized
in another. Today, over a dozen United States courts have ruled that
same-sex marriages created elsewhere must be recognized by their re-
spective state laws.' 5' Thus, as a matter of constitutional structure and
procedure, DOMA is needed today more than ever before.
The critical issue that DOMA resolves is: who decides whether,
when, and to what extent same-sex marriages created in one American
state will be recognized by other states and Congress. Federalism
principles and related concepts regarding separation of powers are the
ultimate sources for the answer to that question. For conflict of laws
scholars, that issue is the most important issue at stake in the ongoing
controversy about interstate recognition of same-sex marriage in the
United States. One hopes that needed conversation on this matter will
take place. Conflicts scholars must maintain integrity and focus, and
not be seduced by political sirens in the guise of various substantive
constitutional doctrines.
151. See generally Lynn D. Wardle, A Response to the "Conservative Case"
for Same-Sex Marriage: Same-Sex Marriage and "The Tragedy of the Commons,"
22 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 441 (2008).
36
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2010], Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol41/iss1/8
THE FEDERAL ARCHITECTURE OF DOMA
APPENDIX
THE LEGAL STATUS OF SAME-SEX UNIONS IN THE U.S. AND GLOBALLY
Legal Status - 1 August 2010
I. LEGAL ALLOWANCE OF SAME-SEX UNIONS IN THE U.S. (50
STATES, D.C., COQUILLE):
A. Same-Sex Marriage Recognized in Five (5) U.S. States:
Connecticut,152 Iowa,' 53 Massachusetts,154 New Hampshire, 5
Vermontl 56 (and in the District of Columbia and the Coquille Indian
Tribe).157
B. Same-Sex Unions Equivalent to Marriage Recognized in Five
(5) U.S. States:
California,' Nevada,' New Jersey,16 0 Oregon, 16 1 and Washing-
ton. 162
152. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
153. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
154. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 943 (Mass. 2003).
155. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (LexisNexis Supp. 2009).
156. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (Supp. 2009).
157. D.C. CODE § 46-401(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); Julie Bushyhead, The
Coquille Indian Tribe, Same-Sex Marriage and Spousal Benefits: A Practical Guide,
26 ARIz. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 509, 509 (2009) ("The Coquille Tribe, located in Ore-
gon, is the first and only Indian tribe to codify the definition of marriage as a fun-
damental right regardless of the biological sex of the parties."). See also Mark P.
Strasser, Tribal Marriages, Same-Sex Unions, and an Interstate Recognition Conun-
drum, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 207, 233 (2010) (noting Coquille legislation and
an incidental Cherokee marriage).
158. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (LexisNexis 2006).
159. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 122A.010-122A.510 (2009).
160. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-28 (West Supp. 2010).
161. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 106.300-106.340 (2009).
162. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.010 (West Supp. 2010).
1792010]
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C. Same-Sex Unions Registry & Specific, Limited Benefits in Six
(6) U.S. Jurisdictionsl63.
Alaska,' 64 Colorado,165 Hawaii, 166 Maryland,167 Maine,168 Wis-
consin. 169
II. LEGAL REJECTION OF SAME-SEX UNIONS IN THE U.S.:
A. Same-Sex Marriage Prohibited by State Constitutional
Amendment in Thirty (30) U.S. States:
Alabama,170 Alaska,17 ' Arizona, 172 Arkansas,173 Califomia,'17 4
Colorado,175 Florida,176 Georgia,'77 Hawaii,' 78 Idaho, 7 9 Kansas,'"s
163. See generally Human Rights Campaign, Marriage & Relationship Rec-
ognition, http://www.hrc.org/issues/marriage/marriage laws.asp (last visited Jul. 27,
2010). Several other states offer state employee partner benefits. See, e.g., ARIZ.
ADMIN. CODE § 2-5-101(2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-48-1, 36-12-1, et. seq. (Supp.
2008); Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445 (Mont. 2004); N.M. Exec. Or-
der No. 2003-010 (Apr. 9, 2003), available at http://www.governor.state.nm.us/ or-
ders/2003/EO_2003 0l0.pdf. See also Lambda Legal, Examples of States that Pro-
vide Benefits to Same-Sex Partners of State Employees (Oct. 2008),
http://data.lambdalegal.org/pdf/legal/statedpl02007rt.pdf
164. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, §§ 38.010, et seq. (2008); Alaska Civil Li-
berties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781, 788-89 (Alaska 2005) (finding that state pro-
grams giving employment benefits to "spouses," but not to same-sex partners of
employees who cannot marry, violates the equal protection clause of the state consti-
tution).
165. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-22-105, 24-50-603 (2009).
166. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-1, et seq. (2006).
167. MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN §§ 1-101, 5-501, 5-509, 5-605, 5-612, 10-
807, 19-310, 19-344 (LexisNexis 2008) (regarding health care facility visitation,
medical visitation decisions, recordation and transfer taxes, and domestic partner-
ships); MD. CODE ANN. TAx-PROP. 12-101 (LexisNexis 2008) (regarding transfer
taxes and domestic relationships).
168. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2710, et seq. (Supp. 2009).
169. WIs. STAT. §§ 765, 770.01, et seq. (West 2010).
170. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03.
171. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 25.
172. ARIZ. CONST. art. 30, § 1, added by Prop. 102.
173. ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 1.
174. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5., added by Prop. 8 § 2.
175. COLO. CONST. art. 2, §31.
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Kentucky,' 81 Louisiana,182 Michigan,183 MiSSissippi, 184 Missouri,' 85
Montana,186 Nebraska, 87 Nevada,188 North Dakota,' 89 Ohio, 90 Okla-
homa,191 Oregon,192 South Carolina, 193 South Dakota,' 94 Tennessee,195
Texas,' 96 Utah, 9 7 Virginia,198 and Wisconsin. 199
B. Same-Sex Civil Unions Equivalent to Marriage Recognition
Prohibited by State Constitutional Amendment in Nineteen (19) U.S.
States (38 %):
Alabama,2 00 Arkansas,20' Florida,202 Georgia,203 Idaho,204 Kan
sas, 205 Kentucky,206 Louisiana, 207 Michigan, 208 Nebraska,20 9 North
176. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
177. GA. CONST. art. 1, § 4(a), par. 1.
178. HAW. CONST. art. 1, §23.
179. IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28.
180. KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16(a).
181. KY. CONST. § 233A.
182. LA. CONST. art. 12, § 15.
183. MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 25.
184. MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 263A.
185. MO. CONST. art. I, § 33.
186. MONT. CONsT. art. 13, § 7.
187. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29.
188. NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21.
189. N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28.
190. OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11.
191. OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 35.
192. OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a.
193. S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15.
194. S.D. CONST. art. 21, § 9.
195. TENN. CONST. art. 11, § 18.
196. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 32(a).
197. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29(1).
198. VA. CONST. art. 1, § 15-A.
199. Wis. CONST. art. XIII, § 13.
200. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03(g).
201. ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 2.
202. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
203. GA. CONST. art. 1, § 4(b).
204. IDAHO CONST. art. III., § 28.
205. KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16(b).
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Dakota,2 10 Ohio,211 Oklahoma,2 12 South Carolina,213 South Dakota,2 14
Texas, 215 Utah,2 16 Virginia,217 and Wisconsin.2 18
C. Same-Sex Marriage Barred by Positive Law or Appellate Deci-
sion in Forty-Three (43) U.S. States, and D.C. 2 19
D. In all 31 U.S. states in which same-sex marriage has been on
the ballot generally, the people (including Maine where in 2009, a
"people's veto" rejected the legislature's approval of same-sex mar-
riage.) have decisively rejected same-sex marriage.220 The total com-
bined vote rejecting same-sex marriage, through the 31 state marriage
amendments, is over 63 %.221
206. KY. CONST. § 233A.
207. LA. CONST. art. 12, § 15.
208. MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 25.
209. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29.
210. N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28.
211. OHIO CONST. art. XV,§ 11.
212. OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 35(A).
213. S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15.
214. S.D. CONST. 21, § 9.
215. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 32(b).
216. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29(2).
217. VA. CONST. art. 1, § 15-A.
218. Wis. CONST. art. XIII, § 13.
219. Same-sex marriage is expressly prohibited in all but the five states allow-
ing same-sex marriage. In New Mexico and Rhode Island, same-sex marriage is
prohibited by common law, but not high court rulings on point. See generally Na-
tional Conference of State Legislatures, Same Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and Do-
mestic Partnerships (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16430. New
York also lacks explicit statutory prohibition of same-sex marriage, but the Court of
Appeals has rejected same-sex marriage. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5
(N.Y. 2006).
220. See DOMA Watch, Marriage Amendment Summary (2009),
http://www.domawatch.org/amendments/amendmentsummary.html; Nelson Tebbe
& Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
1375, 1385 (2010) ("The legislature in Maine tried to [legalize same-sex marriage],
but its law was subsequently repealed by voter referendum" in a People's Veto vote
in 2009); Wardle, Section Three, supra note 2, at app.
221. DOMA Watch, Marriage Amendment Summary (2009),
http://www.domawatch.org/amendments/amendmentsummary.html.
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III. LEGAL ALLOWANCE OF SAME-SEX UNIONS GLOBALLY (OF 192
NATIONS / UN):
A. Same-Sex Marriage Permitted in Nine (9) Nations:
Argentina, 222 Belgium,2 23 Canada,224 Iceland, 225 The Nether-
lands,226 Norway,227 Portugal, 228 Spain,2 29 and Sweden.230
222. Law No. 26.618, July 21, 2010, [CXVIII] B.O. 31.949, available at
http://www.infobae.com/download/55/0345567.pdf.
223. Loi ouvrant le mariage A des personnes de mime sexe et modifiant cer-
taines dispositions du Code civil [Law opening marriage to people of the same sex
and amending certain provisions of the civil code] Feb. 13, 2003 MONITEUR BELGE
[M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Feb. 28, 2003, 3d ed., available at
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/doc/rech_f.htm; Ian Curry-Sumner, Interstate Rec-
ognition of Same-Sex Relationships in Europe, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 59, 61
n.10 (2009).
224. Civil Marriage Act, 2005 S.C., ch. 33 (Can.), available at
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/Statute/C/C-31.5.pdf. See also Halpern v. Toronto
(City), [2003] 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529 (Can.).
225. L6g um breytingar A hj6skaparl6gum og fleiri 16gum og um brottfall laga
um sta6festa samvist (ein hjuskaparlbg) [Law on amendments to the Marriage Act
and the removal of registered partnership (one marriage)] (Law No. 65/2010), avail-
able at http://www.althingi.is/altext/stjt/2010.065.html; Curry-Sumner, supra note
223, at 61 n.18.
226. Wet van 21 december 2000 tot wijziging van Boek 1 van het Burgerlijk
Wetboek in verband met de openstelling van het huwelijk voor personen van het-
zelfde geslacht (Wet openstelling huwelijk) [Law amending the Civil Code to open
marriage to same sex couples], Stb. 2001, p. 9, available at
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-200 1-
9.html?zoekcriteria=%3fzkt%3dUitgebreid%26pst%3dStaatsblad%26dpr%3dAlle%
26jgp%3d2001%26nrp%3d9%26sdt%3dDatumUitgifte%26pnr%3d 1%26rpp%3dl 0
&resultlndex=0&sorttype=1&sortorder-4. See Nancy G. Maxwell, Opening Civil
Marriage to Same-Gender Couples: A Netherlands- United States Comparison, 18
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 141 (2001).
227. Lov om ekteskap [The Marriage Act] (Act 1991-07-04 No. 47 §1),
amended by Act 2008-27-06 No. 53, available at http://www.lovdata.no/cgi-
wift/wiftldles?doc=/app/gratis/www/docroot/all/nl-19910704-
047.html&emne=ekteskapslov*&&; Curry-Sumner, supra note 223, at 62 n.21.
228. Lei n.0 9/2010 de 31 de Maio Permite o casamento civil entre pessoas do
mesmo sexo [Law allowing civil marriage between persons of the same sex] (Law
No. 9/2010), available at http://dre.pt/pdfisdip/2010/05/10500/0185301853.pdf
229. Law 13/2005 of I July, amending the Civil Code concerning the right to
marry (B.O.E. 2005, 11364), available at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2005/07/02/
pdfs/A23632-23634.pdf; Curry-Sumner, supra note 223, at 62 n.23.
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B. Same-Sex Unions Equivalent to Marriage Allowed in Twelve
(12) Other Nations231.*
Andorra,232 Austria,233 Denmark,234 Finland,235 France,236 Germa-
ny,237 Luxembourg,238 New Zealand,239 Slovenia,240 South Africa,241
230. LAG OM UPPHAVANDE AV LAGEN OM REGISTRERAT PARTNERSKAP
[ACT REPEALING THE REGISTERED PARTNERSHIP ACT] (Svensk firfattningssamling
[Swdeish Code of Statutes] [SFS] 2009:260); AKTENSKAPSBALK [AKTB]
[MARRIAGE CODE] 1987:230, available at http://www.riksdagen.se/Webbnav/ in-
dex.aspx?nid=391 1&bet-2009:260; Curry-Sumner, supra note 223, at 62 n.24.
231. See generally Katharina Boele-Woelki, The Legal Recognition of Same-
Sex Relationships Within the European Union, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1949, 1955-59
(2008); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, State Regulation of Sexuality in International Hu-
man Rights Law and Theory, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 797, 853 (2008); Lynn D.
Wardle, A Response to the "Conservative Case" for Same-Sex Marriage: Same-Sex
Marriage and "The Tragedy of the Commons, " 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 441, 443-45,
nn.4-6 (2008); ILGA-EUROPE, Country-by-Country, http://www.ilga-europe.org/
home/guide/country bycountry (last visited Aug. 11, 2010).
232. Qualificada de les unions estables de parella, [Qualified stable unions be-
tween couples] (Law 4/2005) 17 BOPA 25, available at
http://www.ciecl.org/Legislationpdf/Andorre-L.UnionsEstables21f-02-2005-
EnVigueur24mars2005.pdf.
233. EINGETRAGENE PARTNERSCHAFT-GESETZ (EPG) [REGISTERED
PARTNERSHIP LAW] BUNDESGESETZBLATT I (BGBL I) No. 135/2009, available at
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2009_I_135/BGBLA 200
2_I_135.html.
234. Bekendtgorelse af lov om registreret partnerskab [Registered Parnership
Act] (Act. No. 372/1989), available at https://www.retsinformation.dk/
Forms/R0710.aspx?id=31533; Curry-Sumner, supra note 223, at 61 n.12.
235. Laki rekister6idystd parisuhteesta [Act on Registered Partnerships] (Act
No. 950/2001), amended by Act No. 59/2005, available at
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/2001/20010950. See also Boele-Woelki, supra
note 231, at 1955.
236. Loi 99-944 du 15 novembre 1999 [Law No. 99-944 of Nov. 15 1999],
Journal Officiel de la Republique Frangaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Nov.
16, 1999, p. 16959, available at http://www.droit.org/jo/
19991116/JUSX9803236L.html.
237. Gesetz tiber die Eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft [LPartG] [Civil Part-
nership Act], Feb. 16, 2001, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL I] at 266, available at
http://www.juraforum.de/gesetze/lpartg/; Curry-Sumner, supra note 223, at 61 n. 15.
238. Loi du 9 juillet 2004 relative aux effets 16gaux de certains partenariats
[Act of July 9, 2004 on the legal effects of certain partnerships] (Act No. 143/2004),
available at http://www.gouvernement.lu/dossiers/justice/partenariat/loiparten
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Switzerland,242 and UK.243
C. Same-Sex Unions Registry & Limited Benefits Provided in Sev-
en (7) Other Nations:
Columbia,244 Croatia,245 Czech Republic,246 Ecuador,247 Hun-
gary,248 Israel,24 9 and Uruguay.250
ariat.pdf; Curry-Sumner, supra note 223, at 62 n.19.
239. Civil Union Act 2004, 2004 S.N.Z. No. 102, available at
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/200 4 /0102/latest/DLM3234 10.html.
240. Zakon o registracijiistospolne partnerske skupnosti [Law on the Registra-
tion of Same Sex Partnerships] (Act No. 65/2005), available at http://www.uradni-
list.si/1/objava.jsp?urlid=200565&stevilka=2840; Curry-Sumner, supra note 223, at
62 n.22.
241. Minister of Home Affairs & Another v. Fourie & Another 2006 (1) SA
524 (CC) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2005/19.html;
Civil Union Act 17 of 2006, available at http://www.info.gov.za/
view/DownloadFileAction?id=67843. See generally Bradley S. Smith & J.A. Robin-
son, The South African Civil Union Act 17 of 2006: A Good Example of the Dangers
ofRushing the Legislative Process, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 419 (2008).
242. Lol FEDERALE SUR LE PARTENARIAT ENREGISTRI ENTRE PERSONNES Du
MIME SEXE [FEDERAL LAW ON REGISTERED PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN PERSONS OF
THE SAME SEX] June 18, 2004, RECUEIL SYSTEMATIQUE DU DROIT FIDERAL [RS]
211.231, available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/2/211.231.fr.pdf; Curry-Sumner,
supra note 223, at 62 n.25.
243. Civil Partnership Act, 2004, c. 33, available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/33/introduction.
244. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], enero 28, 2009, Sen-
tencia C-029/09, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/
2009/C-029-09.htm; C.C., febrero 7, 2007, Sentencia C-075/07, available at
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/ relatoria/2007/C-075-07.htm.
245. Zakon o istospolnim zajednicama [Law about Same-Sex Unions] Nar-
done Novine 116/2003 (July 22, 2003), available at http://narodne-
novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/306172.html. See also ILGA-EUROPE, supra note 231.
246. Zdkon [Statute] 6. 115/2006 Sb. [Collection of Laws], available at
http://www.mvcr.cz/ mvcren/article/registrovane-partnerstvi.aspx. See also ILGA-
EUROPE, supra note 231.
247. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR art. 68 (constitutionally
allowing same-sex civil unions). See also Pedro Dutour, Ecuador's labyrinth of ne-
bulous ambiguity, MERCATORNET, Oct. 9, 2008, http://www.mercatornet.com/ ar-
ticles/view/ecuadors labyrinthofnebulous-ambiguity/; see generally Wardle, su-
pra note 231, at 445 n.9; ILGA-EUROPE, supra note 231.
248. 2009. 6vi XXIX. A bejegyzett 6lettdrsi kapcsolat 16trejitte (Act estab-
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IV. LEGAL REJECTION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE GLOBALLY:
A. At Least Thirty-five (35) of 192 Sovereign Nations (18%) Have
Constitutional Provisions Explicitly or Implicitly Defining Marriage
as Union ofMan and Woman.251
lishing registered partnerships), available at http://www.kozlonyok.hu/nkonline/
MKPDF/hiteles/mk09063.pdf; see also ILGA-EUROPE, supra note 231.
249. HCJ 3045/05 Ben-Ari & others v. Dir. of Population Admin., Ministry of
the Interior (2) IsrLR 283 [2006] (1sr.), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/fileseng/05/450/030/a09/05030450.a09.htm. See also
Family Courts Law, 5755-1995, SH No. 1537 p. 393 ("reputed spouses"); HCJ
721/94 El-Al Israel Airways Ltd. v. Danielowitz 48(5) PD 749 [1994] (Isr.) (dis-
cussing employment benefits in Israel).
250. La Uni6n Concubinaria [Civil Unions Law] Dec. 27, 2007, Publicada
D.O. 18.246, available at http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/leyes/ AccesoTexto-
Ley.asp?Ley--1 8246&Anchor-.
251. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA art. 35; AzeRBAYCAN
RESPUBLIKASININ KONSTITUSIYASI art. 34 (Azerbaijan); KANST'ITUTS'IIA
RESPUBLIKI BELARUS' art. 32 (Belarus); CONSTITUIQAO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 226
(Braz.); KONSTITUTSIIANA REPUBLIKA BOLGARIIA art. 46 (Bulgaria) ("Matrimony
shall be a free union between a man and a woman."); LA CONSTITUTION DU
BURKINA FASO art. 23; THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA art. 45;
XIANFA art. 49 (1982) (China); CONSTITUCloN POLiTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art.
42 (Colombia); CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA art. 36 (Cuba);
CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR art. 37, 38, 67 (Ecuador); THE
CONSTITUTION OF ERITREA art. 22; FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA OF THE FEDERAL
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA art. 34; CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE GAMBIA art. 27(1); CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS art. 112;
NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO], art. 24 (Japan) ("Marriage shall be based only on the
mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation
with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis."); LATVUAS TUATA SAVA BRIVI
VELETA SATVERSMES SALPULCE IR NOLEMUS SEV ADU VALSTS SATVERSMI art. 110
(Latvia) ("The State shall protect and support marriage - a union between a man and
a woman, ... "); LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCUA art. 38 (Lithuania);
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALAWI art. 22(3); CONSTITUTIA MONITORUL
OFICIAL AL R.MOLDOVA art. 48(2) (Moldova); USTAV CRNE GORE art.
71(Montenegro); THE CONSTITUTION OF NAMIBIA art. 14(1); CONSTITUCI)N
POLITICA DE LA REPUIBLICA DE NICARAGUA art. 72 (Nicaragua); CONSTITUCION DE
LA REPUBLICA DEL PARAGUAY art. 49, 51,52 (Paraguay); CONSTITUCION POLITICA
DEL PERU DE 1993 art. 5 (Peru); KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ art. 18
(Poland); USTAV REPUBLIKE SRBIJE art. 62 (Serbia); GRONDWET VAN DE REPUBLIEK
SURNAME art. 35(2) (Suriname); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF
SWAZILAND ACT art. 27(1); KONSTITUTSIIA RESPUBLIKI TADZHIKISTAN art. 33 (Ta-
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Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Cambodia, China, Columbia, Cuba, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gam-
bia, Honduras, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi, Moldova, Montene-
gro, Namibia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Serbia, Suriname,
Swaziland, Tajiksistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela,
and Vietnam.
B. Eighty-three (83) Nations Have Substantive Constitutional
Provisions Protecting "Marriage, " and One Hundred Forty-five (145)
Nations have Constitutional Provisions Protecting "Family. "252
C. One hundred eighty-three (183) Nations Do Not Allow Same-
sex Marriage.253
D. One hundred seventy-one (171) Nations Do Not Allow Any
Same-sex Marriage-Like Unions.254
jikistan); KONSTITUTSIIA TURKMENSTANA art. 25 (Turkmenistan); CONSTITUTION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA art. 31(1); KONSTITUTSIIA UKRAINI art. 5 1(Ukraine);
CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPIJBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA art. 77 (Venezuela);
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM art. 64. See also
MONGOL ULSYN ONDSEN KHUULI art. 16 (11) (Mongolia); BILL OF RIGHTS
ORDINANCE art. 19(2) (Hong Kong), available at
http://www.constitution.org/cons/hkrigh91.txt.
252. See Lynn D. Wardle, Lessons from the Bill of Rights About Constitution
Protections for Marriage, 38 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 277, 320-22 (2007) (providing a list
of 136 national constitutional provisions). To that list now should be added nine ad-
ditional national constitutions (for a total of 145): THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
KINGDOM OF BHUTAN art. 7(19); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA
art. 27; KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKES SE KoSOVES art. 37 (Kosovo); LATVIJAS TUATA
SAVA BRIVI VELETA SATVERSMES SALPULCE IR NOLEMUS SEV ADU VALSTS
SATVERSMI art. 110 (Latvia); USTAV CRNE GORE art. 40, 71-3 (Montenegro); THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND ACT art. 14(f)(1), 27;
BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] art. 13, 14, 41, 116 (Switz.); CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES art. 15.
253. See Wardle, supra note 252, at app. § III.A. (listing the only nine of 192
sovereign nations that allow same-sex marriage).
254. See Wardle, supra note 252, at app. § III.B. (listing the additional twelve
of 192 sovereign nations that allow same-sex marriage-equivalent unions).
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